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LEARNED LAW, DROIT SAVANT, GELEHRTES
RECHT: THE TYRANNY OF A CONCEPT
Kenneth Pennington
Twenty-five years ago, a paper delivered to an audience of historians treating doctrines of the Ius commune often evoked a stylized ritual
between speaker and audience. Hard-headed historians squirmed and
wiggled in their seats until the last syllable of doctrine passed the lips of
the speaker. As soon as the chair of the session permitted questions,
their hands shot up to ask the inevitable, pragmatic, down-to-earth question: 'Yes, yes. All that you have told us is quite interesting and perhaps even correct. But what does this theory of the learned law have to
do with the practice of the courts, lawyers, and litigants?' The speaker
would then in turn squirm and wiggle a bit, while confessing that
enough work had not yet been done to answer that question with complete certainty. Whatever the speaker added to that admission was immaterial because the questioner had already fallen into self-satisfied
surety. Learned law mattered little, or not at all, in the practical forum.
In some respects, this ritual has changed. Legal historians have
shown again and again how the jurisprudence of the 1us commune
pierced the lowest levels of the judicial system. Richard Helmholz and
Charles Donahue have demonstrated that the doctrines of marriage, procedural, and family law were, for the most part, followed in English
courts;' Manlio Bellomo has pointed out that the doctrines of the Jus
commune guided the practice of Italian courts, penetrated the doctrine
and the language of the ius proprium, and that the 1us commune was 'the
2
sun, the iurapropria are the planets.'
1. See RICHARD H. HELmHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND (Cambridge-New York 1990) (Even after the Reformation in England). See also Helmholz, Origins of
the Privilege againstSelf-incrimination: The Role of the European "Jus commune" 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962-990 (1990); Helmhoz, The Roman Law of Guardianshipin England, 1300-1600, 52
Tun. L. Rav. 223 -257 (1978); HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE

LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL

ENGLAND

(London 1974); Charles Donahue, Jr., Proofby Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England: An Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 127-15 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., Chapel Hill, NC
1981); Donahue, Lyndwood's Gloss propriarumuxorum: MaritalProperty and the lus commune
in Fifteenth-Century England, in EUROPAISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND
GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HELMUT COING Zum 70. GEBURTSTAG 19-37 (Norbert Horn et
al. eds., Mfnchen 1982) (I could cite a number of articles of these two historians in addition to
these, but these make my point).
2. MANLiO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE, 1000-1800 (Lydia G. Cochrane, trans. Washington, D.C., forthcoming 1995), Original ed., L'EUROPA DEL DIRnTro COMUNE
206 (7th ed. Roma 1994).
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Bellomo's metaphor is apt. The Ius commune-Roman, canon,
and feudal law-was taught in the universities of Europe between the
eleventh and sixteenth centuries. Although only canon and feudal law
had practical application in the courts of Europe, the jurists wrote commentaries on all three laws and fashioned a jurisprudence of great sophistication. Over the centuries, their teaching, writing, disputing, and
questioning created an array of norms that became the common coin of
European law. These norms were adopted, adapted, and assimilated into
every European legal system. No legal system 'received' these norms
formally, but every jurist who had been trained in the law schools was
shaped by them.
Historians of all stripes have embraced the Muse of the Ius commune, but while acknowledging her importance for understanding the
structure of society they have often betrayed her. Social historians
record the number of weights on her scales, but do not see justice
through her eyes. Political historians ask her to explain the pragmatic
politics of princes, but never learn her principles. Legal historians have
been transfixed by the intricate detail of her jurisprudence, but do not
recognize her pervasive influence.
I would like to make several points in this essay. First, the historians of national legal systems are still, by and large, balkanized. They
study, explain, and trace the history of their legal systems with only a
cursory nod in the direction of the Ius commune. Second, within the /us
commune, some historians still approach a topic as if its various parts
can be studied in isolation. A Romanist will study a doctrine of Roman
law as if canon and feudal law had only tangential influence on the development of the thought of the civilians.
This balkanization of the Jus commune itself is endorsed by the
titles of the journals in the field. There is a Bulletin of Medieval Canon
Law, a Revue de droit canonique, Revista espafiola de derecho can6nico,
three Zeitschriften der Savigny-Stiftung ffir Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische, Romanistische, and Germanistische Abteilungen. As Manlio
Bellomo has observed, these titles help to convey the idea to readers and
scholars working in these fields that each law has a separate history,
3
independent of the other.
3. Id. at 92. And scholars still write monographs on doctrines in canon law or Roman law
without looking at the 1us commune as a whole piece of cloth. A recent example of this type of
scholarship
ANFANGEN

is HANS PETER GLOCKNER, CorrATIONIS POENAM NEMO PATITUR: ZU DEN
VERSUCHSLEHRE IN DER JURISPRUDENZ .DER GLOSSATOREN in lus COMMUNE,

SONDERHEFTE,

STUDIEN ZUR EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE

who concentrates almost exclusively on the civilians.

42 (Frankfurt am Main 1989)
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Our textbooks reflect the same categories. Theodore Plucknett's
History of the Common Law devotes a chapter to Roman law and its
influence on English law and a chapter to canon law. 4 When he discusses the influence of each on English law, he separates Roman law's
influence from canon law's by a number of pages and by a sure conviction that each can be treated in isolation. Maitland, in contrast, did not
separate these two key ingredients of the Ius commune from each other
in his History of English Law.5 He did not know the terminology that
we use today, but he wrote as if he did. Even Maitland, however, did
not completely understand the relationship of the Ius commune and secular legal systems. At the end of his chapter on Roman and canon law, he
writes:
Our English law shows itself strong enough to assimilate foreign ideas
and convert them to its own use. Of any wholesale 'reception' of Roman law there is no danger.... From time to time the more learned
among them [king's justices] will try to attain a foreign, an Italian, standard of accuracy and elegance; they will borrow terms and definitions,
they will occasionally borrow rules; but there must be no dictationfrom
without [my emphasis]. The imperial laws as such have no rights in
England; the canon law has its proper province and should know its
6
place.
From the perspective of the late twentieth century, these concluding
thoughts on the influence of the 1us commune seem quaint and patriotic-even if they were Maitland's. He imagines that there was no danger of a wholesale reception of Roman law; but there was no danger of
that anywhere in Europe. The Jus commune provided an intellectual
model, not a tool of conquest. Englishmen, Maitland assures his readers, sure of their Englishness, would brook no dictation from without.
However, the Jus commune ruled nowhere by force. English jurists filled their libraries with the books of the 1us commune that remain in
England until the present day. They took what was useful to them; they
left what was not. English jurists voted with their feet, although they
may not have been as swift afoot as others who were closer to the great
centers of learning. The point is that every European legal system had
the same relationship to the 1us commune; England was not a solitary,
insular, and precocious exception.
4. THEODORE F.T. PLUIcKNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMoN LAW 294-306 (Boston

1956).
5. I

FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,

THE

HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW BEFORE THE TINm OF EDWARD 11 11-35 (S.F.C. Milsom ed., Cambridge 1968).

6. Id. at 135.
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Finally, to come to the title of this paper, the first two points may in
many ways be summed up briefly; even the terms that we use to describe the Ius commune convey the idea that the law taught in the
schools of Europe from the eleventh to the sixteenth century is academic
law, Juristenrecht, fit only for professors and other bookish types.
Doughty lawyer types not only did not know it, they scorned it. They
would not submit to its dictates. Consequently, legal historians feel free
to ignore the Ius commune when they study the history of the law of
their nation state.
Almost everyone who has trolled the waters of legal history during
the past twenty-five years, including myself, has not taken the Ius commune fully into account when one should have. Within the past
twenty-five or so years legal historians have become aware of the linkages between the two major components of the Ius commune, Roman
law and canon law, and in turn, the great influence that the 1us commune
exercised over other legal systems in Europe. What I would like to
demonstrate in the following remarks is how preconceptions and language can affect interpretation.
One of the foremost interpreters of medieval English law today is
S.F.C. Milsom. In 1968 he wrote an introductory essay for a reissuance
of Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law. Milsom's essay covers fifty pages. His conclusions are pertinent:
This essay has suggested, not that Maitland misheard, but that sometimes he misunderstood ... It is the framework of their discussion that
is in issue, their factual and intellectual situation ... If Maitland set his
watch by any one source, it was by Bracton. But Bracton's Roman
learning, good or bad, may have been chiefly important as vicarious
experience enabling him to see with eyes not representative of his own
time... What Bracton did was to describe the common law, but from a
view-point that its practitioners did not share. What the practitioners
started from was Brevia Placitata. This is to suppose a difference between Bracton and the practitioner more fundamental than the mere
knowledge of some Roman rules . . . It is also to attribute to book
learning in legal matters a force greater than that seen by Bracton himself... greater than that seen by Maitland himself when he spoke of the
toughness of taught law. It is not a matter of knowledge ... it is a
question of the terms in which aa lawyer thinks. I believe that in some
respects Maitland, working as it were backwards from Bracton, sup7
poses too great a degree of general sophistication.

7. Id. at Ixxii-xxiii.

1994]

Tyranny of a Concept

209

Let me gloss Milsom's text. 'Maitland set his watch by Bracton.'
Maitland was too captivated by Bracton's learning. 'Bracton's Roman
learning <was> a vicarious experience enabling him to see with eyes not
representative of his own time.' Milsom's sentences are sometimes not
easy, and this one is challenging. It might mean Bracton's study of the
Ius commune transformed him into a 'learned lawyer' who viewed English law from the school room. Consequently, he could not see the
rough and tumble of thirteenth-century English law through his bookish
spectacles. I am open to other interpretations. In part, I rest my interpretation on Milsom's next sentence: 'What Bracton did was to describe
the common law, but from a viewpoint that its practitioners did not
share.'
Let us reflect awhile on that sentence. Bracton was learned, a professional type. He could not understand the law as a simple practitioner
understands the law. Therefore, he misunderstood thirteenth-century
English law. He thus misled Maitland.
In the end, Milsom's assertion is unprovable, and I shall not debate
it, only highlight its assumptions. However, we can examine his presuppositions. Bracton knew too much law, he described English law using
the sophisticated terminology of the 1us commune, and therefore misled
himself, misled Maitland, and left everyone else in England lying stupifled before him.
One might be skeptical of such a hypothesis on its own terms. If
Samuel Thorne's theories about Bracton are correct, Milsom should,
perhaps, rethink his Bracton.8 If there had been an Ur-Bracton, and if a
number of hands participated in revising the work we call Bracton over a
long period of time, then Bracton was far from being a solitary figure.
The number of manuscripts of Bracton's treatise are further evidence
that Bracton's knowledge was neither unique, nor unappreciated by English jurists during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
To return to Milsom. He argues that the difference between
Bracton and the practitioner was more fundamental than mere knowledge of some Roman rules-historians attribute book learning in legal
matters a force greater than that seen by Bracton himself. It is, Milsom
proclaims, a question of the terms in which a lawyer thinks. I'm sure
that Milsom thinks of himself as pragmatic and hard-headed. No wooly
ideas will deflect him from piercing to the root of medieval English law.
Practitioners, not ideas, shaped English law from Bracton on. Legal institutions, Milson believes, are built from the bottom up, and if we look
8. IX] SAMUEL E. THORNE, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND xv-lii (Cambridge,

Mass. 1968-1977).
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at the superstructure of ideas, we shall lose ourselves in a fog of phantasmagoria. From this viewpoint, the Ius commune could not have had
connections to English law because the sturdy practitioner of English
law, Master Necessity, echoed the famous legal maxim of the lus commune, necessity knows no law.
A year later when Milsom published his HistoricalFoundationsof
the Common Law, he divided the thirteenth century into two parts. 9 The
age of Bracton and post Bracton. Actions became the domain of the
narrators or counters in the thirteenth century. According to Milsom,
they had no- legal learning and could only recite formal statements of
claim for their clients. The counters produced Brevia Placitataat the
same time that Bracton produced his work. To use Milsom's words:
The former was to prove fruitful, the latter sterile... just as the writs in
Brevia Placitatashow counters looking upward to learn the administrative and jurisdictional elements, so Bracton's book shows the administrator looking downward at what was happening in court .... Like the
best civil servants of a later age, Bracton and his kind had, as it were,
read the greats.
I may or may not have correctly and fairly characterized Milsom's view
of the evolution of English law, but his last sentence is telling. He
clearly thinks that learned law, the Ius commune, is an intellectual construct that has no real significance in the development of English legal
institutions. The 1us commune is book learning, a vicarious experience,
knowledge that was like reading the greats.
Is that true? To believe that any of these definitions of the Jus
commune is true would mean believing that the law schools of Europe
taught English students the principles, the nuts and bolts of Roman and
canon law, only because those students wanted to study the greats of
law. They brought hundreds of legal manuscripts to England, had more
copied, merely to have the greats of law on their shelves. If this is true,
it is one of the most bizarre stories in the history of law.
Historians of later English law often write their histories as if Milsom is right. And that is lamentable. One example will illustrate my
point. Norman Doe recently discussed consent, equity, natural and positive law, and justice in fifteenth century English law.10 He plunges into
the Year Books and statutes with almost no attention to the Jus commune, and his assumptions, that he shares with Milsom, have led him
9. S.F.C. MELSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CoMMON LAW 29 (London 1969).
10. NoRMAN DOE, FuNDAMENTAL AurioRrr, IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW (Cambridge-New York 1990).
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astray. In chapter three he finds a contradiction in the legislative doctrine of Fortescue:
For, at the same time as saying 'law is that which is consented to by
king and people', and 'bad rules are still laws', Fortescue also says 'law
is that which is authorised by divinely created natural law,' and 'bad
rules, if they offend natural law, are not laws at all'."I
Doe argues that Fortescue is not consistent. But, he writes in another
place, his 'outlook tallies with those of his predecessors and contemporaries:' Augustine, John of Salisbury, and Gratian. 12 If he had even
glanced at the Jus commune, he would have found that Fortescue's doctrine did not contradict itself, but only reflected legal platitudes of the
fifteenth-century Ius commune. Foretscue did not draw is legislative
theory from Augustine, John of Salisbury, or Gratian (a strange triumvirate for a historian of late medieval law to draw upon in any case). All
three would have been baffled by the idea that bad law could be valid
law. But more importantly and to the point, putting Fortescue's thought
in context by comparing it to this troika is simply betraying Fortescue.
A jurist of the Jus commune would have expressed Fortescue's notion of law by saying that 'law should be consented to by the prince and
by the people.' Even unjust or bad laws are valid because the source of
law is in the will of the prince. They had a maxim to express the idea:
'pro ratione voluntas.' The jurists had decided in the first half of the
thirteenth century that the will of the prince was the key element that
defined the validity of positive law. Therefore, if a statute of positive
law was 'bad,' that is unreasonable or unjust, it was still valid law. They
wrote: 'If, however, a law violates a principle of natural or divine law,
that law is invalid.' Fortescue did not claim that all positive law emanated from natural law, only that some positive law was derived from
natural law. Every jurist of the Ius commune would have agreed.
Fortescue's theory of legislation is not inconsistent or incoherent, but
3
has the unmistakable imprint of the 1us commune.'
The context of every medieval legal text is crucial. When the Jus
commune is omitted from the historian's purview, the results can be seriously misleading. Joseph Strayer probably knew the French legal
records of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, as well as
anyone who has studied them. In his long distinguished, career he rather
11. Id. at 83.
12. Id. at 78.

13. For a discussion of these issues, see KENNETH PENNINGTON, POPE AND BIsHOPS: THE
PAPAL MONARCHY iN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTuarEs 17-29 (Philadelphia 1984) and
THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600: SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTs IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADmON Ch. 3 passim (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1993).
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proudly and consciously kept the 'learned law' out of his text. In one of
the last works he wrote, he examined an early fourteenth-century French
court record, in which he found a passage that he thought illustrated
Roman law's royalist and authoritarian tendencies in the hands of the
French jurists of Paris. With some relish he wrote:
En fait, le droit romain est devenu 'royaliste' seulement quand il s'est
dtabli AParis. La poign~e de gens de justice forms au droit romain qui
ont travaill lI ont acquis la 'religion de la monarchie,' et ils ont interpr~t6 leurs connaissances juridiques A la lumire de leur nouvelle foi.
Plaisians illustre peut-8tre, avec ses c6l bres remarques sur l'autoirit6
royale, en G~vaudan, le cas le plus extreme de cette tendance.
The text of Strayer's 'extreme case' in the following:
Omnia que sunt intra fines regni sui sint domini Regis, saltim quoad
protectionem et altam jurisdictionem et dominationem et etiam quantum
ad proprietatem omnium singularium rerum . . . quas dominus Rex
donare, recipere et consumere potest, ex causa publice utilitatis deffensionis regni sui ... Item quod dominus Rex sit imperator in regno suo et
imperare possit terre et mari- et omnes populi regni sui eius regantur
14
imperio.
Strayer knew that this text drew upon Roman law. He read it literally
and drew what he thought were self-evident conclusions. What he did
not know was that these ideas date back to the twelfth century. 15 Accursius wrote in the mid-thirteenth century to Cod. 7.37.3 (Bene a Zenone),
the locus classicus for discussions of the emperor's sovereignty:
Omnia principis esse intelligatur: et hic expone ad protectionem uel
iurisdictionem ... Vel uerius omnia sua sunt, 'scilicet fiscalia et patrimonialia... Vnde codex meus non est principis.'
No jurist of the thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries interpreted the
phrase 'all things belong to the king or emperor or prince' as Strayer
interpreted it. They cheerfully acknowledged that the king might be said
to have jurisdiction over all things, but they recoiled from concluding
that this doctrine granted the king the right to expropriate property arbitrarily or to rule tyrannically.1 6 Furthermore, this French jurist acknowledges that the prince must act according to the public utility, the norm
with which the jurists limited the prince's authority to confiscate his
14.

JOSEPH

R.

STRAYER, LES GENS DE JUSTICE DU LANGUEDOC SOUS PHILIPPE LE BEL 44 (5

Cahiers de L'Association Marc Bloch de Toulouse Etudes d'Histoire Mridionale; Toulouse
1970).

15.

KENNETH PENNINGTON, PRINCE AND THE LAW,

1200-1600:

IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 17 (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1993).

16. See id. at chs. 1, 2, and 3.

SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS
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subjects' property. The jurists of the 1us commune had created the terminology of utilitaspublica a century before.
Strayer never would have written the paragraph that I have just
quoted if he had read the Glossa ordinariaof Justianian's Code and the
commentaries of the thirteenth century on the pertinent texts of Roman
law. An unreliable witness has reported that he 'hated . . . Romano-canonical scholarship, which Strayer early saw was something of
a racket. ' 17 Whether Strayer hated the scholarship of the Jus commune
or not is an open question; he did not, however, know it.
One last example from Italy. In a recent book James Grubb put
forward the remarkable thesis that the city-state of Venice rejected Roman law and the Jus commune. 'Since Venice recognized no superior, it
held a status independent of and equivalent to the emperor. . . Venetians make no use of the ius commune in sentences delivered in Venice.' 18 Grubb's claim is based on the work of Lamberto Pansolli. 19
Pansolli cites texts to prove that Venice recognized no superior, was a
sovereign state, and, consequently was not ruled by imperial law, but
'natural justice and its own laws.' 20
If Grubb and Pansolli are right, it would be one of the most intriguing stories of legal history. The Venetians compiled and codified their
law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Jacopo Tiepolo compiled a
Liber statutorum et legum Venetorum in 1242. He modeled his new
collection on Pope Gregory IX's Decretales. Andrea Dandolo imitated
the model of Pope Boniface VIII's Liber sextus when he issued his own
Liber sextus in 1346. The 1us commune infiltrates every nook and
cranny of these compilations.
Grubb claims that these statutes fell into disuse during the fifteenth
century.2 1 This is an interesting theory. The statutes were translated
into the Venetian dialect in 1477 and printed. In 1492, the Latin text and
the translation were published together. Jacobo Novello printed the statutes again in 1564, and a final edition appeared in 1729. Either the
Venetians were fascinated by legal history or they expended a lot of
22
energy on statutes that were no longer used.
17. NORMAN F. CANTOR, INVENTING THE MIDDLE AGES: THE LIVES, WORKS, AND IDEAS OF
THE GREAT MEDIEVALISTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

101 (New York 1991).

18. JAMEs S. GRUBB, FIRSTBORN OF VENICE: VICENZA IN THE EARLY RENAISSANCE STATE

31-32 (Baltimore-London 1988).
19.

LAMBERTO PANSOLLI,

LA GERARCHIA DELLE FONTI DI DIRITTO NELLA LEGISLAZIONE

MEDIEVALE VENEZIANA 219-248 (Milano 1970).

20. Id. at 223-26.
21. JAMEs S. GRUBB, FIRSTBORN OF VENICE 32 (1988).

22. See generally Armin Wolf, Die Gesetzgebung der entstehenden Territorialstaaten,in 1
HANDBUCH

DER QUELLEN

UND

LITERATUR DER NEUEREN

EUROPAISCHEN

PRIVATRECHTSGES-
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This example also illustrates the importance of understanding the
language, norms, and principles of the 1us commune before leaping to
'sensible' and 'obvious' conclusions. Neither Grubb nor Pansolli recognizes the implications of the language of medieval and early modem
sovereignty. When the jurists argued that a king, prince, city-state was
'imperator in regno suo' and 'non superiorem recognoscunt,' they established the authority of the king, prince, city-state to make law, to abolish
law, and to be sovereign over their territory. 23 They are, in other words,
talking about the right of the prince or state to make, derogate, abrogate
law without interference from a superior. This was a key issue of medieval jurisprudence. They are not discussing by which law their judicial
system should be governed. These jurists understood that the positive
law of the prince, or the state, and custom regulated local legal practices
and statutes. They are not 'rejecting' the Roman law of the schools, the
24
Ius commune, or any other set of norms.
The Venetians themselves had a close relationship to the Ius commune. They had one of the most distinguished law schools of the Jus
commune at their doorstep, their sons attended its lectures and graduated
with its degrees, their printers produced edition after edition of its jurisprudence, and most importantly, their law was saturated with its terminology, norms, and maxims. It would have been surprising, startling, if
Venetians had consciously rejected the norms of a legal system that had
shaped their own jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of every legal system of Europe.
One example of the norms of the Ius commune regulating Venetian
law is provided by Patricia Labalme in her article on the prosecution of
sodomy by Venetian courts. 25 The torture of defendants and witnesses
was severely circumscribed by the Ius commune, and the Italian city
states generally enacted legislation to protect their inhabitants from arbitrary treatment at law.2 6 Labalme has shown that the norms of the Ius
CHICHTE: MrrTELALTER 717-721 (1100-1500) (Helmut Coing ed., 1973) (For a brief summary of
Venetian law).
23. See generally PANSOLLI, supra note 19, at 247-248 (Pansolli cites a text of Bernardo

Giustinian as a conclusive piece of evidence supporting his contention that the Venetians rejected
Roman law: 'Legibus igitur imperatoriis onnino abstinuerunt, quod normulli ad earn causam
referunt, ne praeiudicium facerent Venetae libertati, nonnullorum regum exemplo'. This text

means that the Venetians, as other kings, do not recognize the legal force of Roman legislation.
The phrase, 'nonnullorum regum exemplo,' is crucial and refers to the maxim, 'Rex imperator in

regno suo est'.).
24. See generally PENNINGTON, supra note 15, at 31-37, 95-101 (On these conceptions of

sovereignty in the lus commune).
25. Patricia Labalme, Sodomy and VenetianJustice in the Renaissance,52 TIDscirIiir VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 217-254 (1984).

26. See PENNINGTON, supra note 15, at 42-44, 148, 157-160.
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commune had been incorporated into the procedure of the Venetian
courts during the fifteenth century and that these rules of procedure offered some protection to defendants from arbitrary treatment, even when
27
the crime was as heinous as sodomy.
Manlio Bellomo has used the imagery of the Ius commune as the
sun and the iura propria, the legal norms of kingdoms, principalities,
and city-states, as the planets, to explain the relationship of the Jus commune and iurapropria.28 The metaphor is perceptive and accurate. The
sun is not an inert mass, without energy or gravity, that does not exercise
any influence on the planets. To describe the sun as a great theoretical
star in the sky that has no real life or influence of its own would be silly.
On the other hand, the planets have their own conditions, forces, norms
that regulate their self-contained worlds. Each planet has a different set
of rules, but each is affected in different ways and from a different distance by the energy of the sun. No planet would reject the sun; it would
be folly and unthinkable. The result would be chaos for the planet's
system.
My conclusions can be stated succinctly: The 1us commune was
not bookish law, was not the law of the greats, to be read, savored, and
returned to the shelf, was not learned law in contrast to real law. It was
the cauldron from which much of the precious metal of all European
legal systems emerged.

27. Labalme, supra note 25, at 222-225, 227-229 (for other examples of 'due process' in the
cases of sodomy, see 243-244).
28. BELLOMO, supra note 2, at 205-206.

